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The Narrative Mood of Jean Rhys’ Quartet 
Octavio R. González 
 
Abstract: This article evaluates the application of dominant institutional discourses, such as 
psychoanalysis, in the interpretation of literary fiction. I take up the case of Jean Rhys and her 
1929 novel, Quartet. Both author and novel have been analyzed through the concept of 
masochism, as creating masochistic characters or a masochistic aesthetic. But what do we mean 
when we so classify or “diagnose” authors of literature or fictional characters as in the case of 
Rhys’ and Quartet’s protagonist? Against this mode of reading, I argue that Rhys’ novel asks us, 
in various ways, to understand it on its own terms, suggesting a mode that I call immanent 
reading. It enjoins the reader to understand rather than to classify the famously problematic Rhys 
“heroine.” Ultimately, Quartet foregrounds the instability of moral and social positions, 
implicitly arguing against what it calls the “mania for classification” employed by the novel’s 
antagonists. Quartet cautions against diagnostic interpretations by dramatizing scenes of 
hypothetical focalization, emphasizing the modal nature of reality and providing the novel with 
its characteristically shadowy mood. Mood is a term drawn from Gérard Genette, which 
describes how certain narrative choices and devices (or mode) compose a discursive narrative 
atmosphere (or mood). This project suggests the untapped potential of narratology for analyzing 
affect in fictional narrative. 
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Deleuze treats differences in literary techniques . . . as evidence for ostensible 
differences between “sadism” and “masochism.” But what are the “sadism” and 
“masochism” of which he speaks? Are they literary genres? Practices of living 
sadists and masochists? Floating formations of desire?   
Gayle Rubin, “Sexual Traffic” (93)  
 
It was astonishing how significant, coherent and understandable it all became 
after a glass of wine on an empty stomach. . . . The Place Blanche, Paris, Life 
itself. One realized all sorts of things. The value of an illusion, for instance, and 
that the shadow can be more important than the substance.  
Jean Rhys, Quartet (23; emphasis added) 
 
I. Introduction: The Trouble with Masochism  
Jean Rhys’ first novel Quartet (1929) is an infamous roman à clef about the affair 
between Rhys and Ford Madox Ford, which inevitably involved their respective partners, Jean 
Lenglet and Stella Bowen. Despite its real-life inspiration, however, Quartet has an aesthetic life 
of its own. Marya Zelli is the protagonist and center of consciousness of the novel. The other 
 2 
 
central characters are Hugh and Lois Heidler, a wealthy English art dealer and his wife, who is a 
painter; and Stephan Zelli, Marya’s husband, an art dealer of sorts himself. The Heidlers rule the 
British expatriate scene in 1920s Paris. Stephan is arrested soon after the story begins for 
trafficking in stolen artifacts. Stephan’s imprisonment is the impetus for Marya’s accepting the 
Heidlers’ offer to move in with them (48). Soon after, Heidler announces his love for Madame 
Zelli. At first, Marya resists Heidler’s overtures, but Lois—of all people—convinces her to stay 
and give in to him. Marya eventually becomes Heidler’s mistress, while Stephan languishes in 
prison. A year later, before Stephan is released, Heidler tells Marya that she must leave her 
husband or the affair is over. Torn, Marya confesses to Stephan that she and Heidler are lovers. 
The novel ends when, “[n]umbed by misery, Marya mismanages the situation and loses both 
men,” in the words of Francis Wyndham (Introduction, 7), Rhys’ longtime editor. It is the nature 
of this “misery” that is in contention, then as now.  
Some have read the misery of Rhys’ heroines through the psychoanalytic lens of 
masochism. For instance, in a recent collection, Rhys Matters, Jennifer Mitchell builds on the 
plentiful readings of masochism in Rhys and Quartet. Mitchell’s intervention draws on Gilles 
Deleuze and rehabilitates masochism by applying a feminist standpoint, seeing it as 
“empowering.”1 Rather than proposing another version of a Rhys heroine as “victim,”2
 
Mitchell 
argues that Marya’s affair with Heidler—and her tortured dynamic with his wife—constitute a 
scenario of masochism for all three participants.3
 
“The impulse to diagnose Marya’s masochism 
as self-destructive and, therefore, victimizing undercuts the ways in which Marya accesses 
autonomy and satisfaction,” Mitchell writes (203-04; emphasis added). Mitchell explains that 
Marya “begins to relish the torturous position that she occupies” (204). Mitchell thus recuperates 
Marya’s seeming weakness as a position of strength—albeit one vexed by the definition of 
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masochism as self-induced suffering. The novel is rescued through the agency of psychoanalytic 
discourse—a systematic mode of knowing fortified by institutional power, premised on 
categorical classification. Yet it is this form of institutionalized knowledge that the novel itself 
challenges, as I will demonstrate. 
I cite this example because it engages in the psychoanalysis of literary characters, even 
the psychoanalysis of literary style.4
 
And while there is much vibrant work on the intersection of 
modernism and masochism, especially on Rhys, this paper opens a space for methodological 
questions about the use of psychopathological categorization in the context of literary 
interpretation. My argument, however, is not against “clinical” interpretations of literature. 
Rather, I am more interested in the reading practice that I think Rhys’ novel itself invites us to 
adopt, in its narrative technique, as well as in its content.  
 
II. Resisting the “mania for classification” 
The novel is narrated largely from the protagonist’s point of view, which means that most 
of the narrative is internally focalized.5 Given the predominance of Marya’s focalization, it is 
important that in the first two chapters, there are certain passages that depart from this pattern, 
where the narrator addresses the reader directly and sketches Marya’s background: “Marya, you 
must understand, had not been suddenly and ruthlessly transplanted from solid comfort to the 
hazards of Montmartre. Nothing like that. Truth to say, she was used to a lack of solidity and of 
fixed backgrounds” (15; emphasis added). The direct address to the reader, in “you must 
understand,” frames Marya Zelli as a deracinated figure before the affair even begins, 
foreshadowing her sense of feeling like a “ghost walking in a vague, shadowy world” (57; 
emphasis added).6
 
What the reader “must understand” is that Marya was already “used to” living 
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in the half lit world of the demimonde; she is a former chorus girl, and her husband Stephan sells 
art works of uncertain provenance (including what he claims was Napoleon’s sword). This 
passage echoes one in the previous chapter, which also characterizes Marya as not only transient 
but undefined: “there were moments when she realized that her existence, though delightful, was 
haphazard. It lacked, as it were, solidity; it lacked the necessary fixed background” (8).  
These two passages, linked by their common language, and their external view of the 
protagonist, serve as framing devices. What is more, the singularity of the direct address suggests 
something about the overall mood of the narrative. The mood of Rhys’ novel is almost palpable 
as an atmosphere that sustains hazy perception, epistemological uncertainty, and emotional 
instability in the not-so-transparent minds of the characters and in the narrative discourse that 
envelops and instantiates them. Quartet is a storyworld made of various shadings of light and 
dark, a dynamic chiaroscuro of shadow and illusion. Another narrative frame that situates Marya 
in a world of “shadow” and “illusion” occurs at the end of Chapter 2: “It was astonishing how 
significant, coherent and understandable it all became after a glass of wine on an empty stomach. 
. . . The Place Blanche, Paris, Life itself. One realized all sorts of things. The value of an illusion, 
for instance, and that the shadow can be more important than the substance” (23; emphasis 
added).  
In what follows, I argue that this preliminary framing of the protagonist can also help us 
understand the novel as a whole. In particular, I focus on a narrative technique—the technique of 
focalization—which, I argue, models for the reader how to understand the novel itself as a 
“vague, shadowy world.” It is this world of shadow and illusion that the novel wants readers to 
value, to view the “shadow” as “more important than the substance.” This direct address to the 
reader thus signals an important moment, one that solicits the reader’s understanding of Marya. 
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Note, however, that the narrator does not ask us to diagnose—or classify—her.  
As the reading of masochism in Rhys indicates, many critics use formal classification or 
psychoanalytic diagnosis to interpret the novel. Yet, in so doing, such critics mirror the Heidlers’ 
way of “reading,” their mode of knowing, what the novel calls the “mania for classification” (60, 
118). This “mania for classification” is linked to institutional forms of knowledge: normative 
discourses, like psychoanalysis, that function as heavy instruments of power. Marya claims that 
Heidler “crushed her. He bore [her] down,” at one point, noting how “He had everything on his 
side . . . Everything. Including Logic and Common Sense” (119). The Heidlers stand for this 
powerful way of knowing, a logical and commonsensical mode of putting people into categories, 
and, in so doing, exerting discursive control over social reality.  
By contrast, the narrator’s language of understanding introduces a mode of knowing 
based on affective connection with social experience, either first- or second-hand, by attending to 
subjective accounts of that experience. As Stephan, Marya’s husband, notes, “You don’t know 
what it is, la misère. Nobody knows what it is till it’s got them” (172; emphasis in orig.). The 
only way to know his misery, Stephan claims, is to experience it (“Nobody knows what it is till 
it’s got them”). Barring first-hand experience of la misère, the narration proposes a secondary 
way of knowing—what the narrator calls “understanding.” Another example of the “mania for 
classification” as an oppressive mode of knowing occurs when Marya critiques the Heidlers for 
“[i]magining they know a thing when they know its name” (130; emphasis added). She adds that 
“Lois and he [Hugh] pretended to be fair and were hard as hell underneath. . . . [T]hey couldn’t 
feel anything and pretended that nobody else could” (130). Here, Marya challenges the Heidlers’ 
propensity for labeling or classifying a thing (“knowing its name”) by suggesting that it is a form 
of mistaken understanding. She adds that they share a rigid incapacity to “feel” and, by the same 
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token, the Heidlers “pretend nobody else could” feel as well. The Heidlers are thus faulted for 
callousness (“hard as hell underneath”) and for a lack of sympathy (“they couldn’t feel 
anything”). Their lack of feeling is self-serving (“pretended nobody else could”) and ensures a 
studied lack of curiosity about others’ feelings. Lacking empathy and sympathy, they project an 
objectifying, classifying gaze: knowing the “name” of something, they falsely “imagine” they 
know the thing itself.7 This is what the narration calls the Heidlers’ “mania for classification.”  
This “mania for classification” comes with the conviction of being correct in all matters, 
which makes others fall in line with the Heidlers’ chauvinistic, self-authorizing point of view—
one Marya describes as “strangely without pity” (64). Heidler rules the colony of English 
expatriates in Montparnasse, a veritable “autocrat,” per his wife (65). These examples of the 
Heidlers’ power to assert their own point of view is contrasted with Marya’s powerlessness: her 
“longing to assert her point of view” (60) is repeatedly thwarted by the social authority of the 
Heidlers and their cronies. The tension in the narrative, then, consists in two ways of being in—
and knowing—the world: in the words of the novel, one way of being in the world is that which 
is demanded by the powerful and the elite, by the normative forces of society, as represented by 
the respectable Heidlers. They rule the British Montparnos, while the Zellis live a “haphazard” 
“existence” in the “hazards of Montmartre”; they are disreputable “vagabonds” (8, 15, 60). As 
opposed to authoritative classification, which is the modus operandi of the Heidlers, 
understanding requires a capacity for feeling and respect for others’ feelings—a suspension of 
prejudgment and a desire to connect through empathy.  
We can profitably read Quartet by seeking to understand it as a cautionary tale against 
the “mania for classification” that dooms Marya at the hands of the Heidlers; the moral of this 
modernist novel, if there is one, is to resist this urge to classify, to try a different approach, one 
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less beholden to existing norms and institutionally validated systems of knowing. To 
“understand,” in my reading, means to read sympathetically and empathetically, by going along 
with the experiences of the protagonist, even as she descends into misery during her romantic 
obsession. To objectify these experiences, by classifying or even diagnosing them, violates the 
mood of the novel, its focus on subjective experience and empathetic understanding. 
Understanding that misery, rather than classifying it, is ultimately the point. Not to classify but to 
understand: this hermeneutic practice is represented not only by the experiences of the 
protagonist but also in the way they are narrated in the discourse of the novel itself. In other 
words, we are meant to understand a “lack of solidity and of fixed backgrounds” as the novel’s 
aesthetic principle. The novel’s style of presentation values shadow and illusion rather than 
schemes of classification.8  
The formal paths of the novel turn on two ways of knowing—“classifying” or 
“understanding.” Hence, the meaning of Quartet is partially about how to read it—or how to 
understand the stories that people tell of themselves and others and of their complex social 
situations. One can know the name of a thing without understanding it. Or one can understand 
the thing itself, but only by living through it, as Stephan warns, or by the capacity to feel and 
understand others’ feelings, their affective reality. In sum, the narrative’s injunction to 
understand functions as a counterpoint to the classifying moves made by two of the story’s 
central characters, which are, in turn, mirrored in critical approaches to Rhys. The text responds 
to the false certainty of naming, classification, or even clinical diagnosis, with the ambiguities of 
subjective viewpoints and their limited purchase on social reality, including the reality of other 
viewpoints.  
While classification is not synonymous with diagnosis, the two modes of knowing assert 
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a normative purchase on reality, a systematic and categorical knowledge. Understanding, in this 
novel, is is hazy, intuitive, affective, and unsystematic—as, one might say, befits the hazy, 
“shadowy” mood of Quartet and its heroine. Such shadowy form of knowing as understanding 
leads to over- or misinterpretation. The problem of knowing and perceiving through the haziness 
of understanding, as insight into others whose motivations are unknown to us, is the subject of 
the next section. 
The narrative plainly elevates the problem of how to understand accurately without 
classifying or pathologizing the object of one’s interest, the object of one’s “nonce taxonomy,” to 
quote Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (23, passim). In Epistemology of the Closet, Sedgwick coins the 
phrase “nonce taxonomy” to indicate ways of knowing that ordinary people perform as they go 
about their ordinary lives, as opposed to modes of knowing that bend to the force field of 
institutional power. Such systems of knowledge are what Foucault termed power-knowledge, 
linked to modern discourses of sexology and psychiatry, such as masochism and hysteria. A 
similar ethical and aesthetic argument to Foucault’s—that knowledge is a form of power and 
control, deployed as a mode of social domination—is played out at the level of Quartet’s formal 
concerns with focalization and thematic concerns with intersubjective conflict. Such conflicts are 
the “obsessions of love and hate” that beset Quartet’s central characters (97). The novel employs 
subtle techniques of focalization in the service of representing fraught dynamics, in contrast to 
what could be called the “sadism of epistemology” inherent in the Heidlers’ “mania for 
classification.”9  
As narratologist Monika Fludernik claims, in many fictional narratives, “we come across 
a strategy of repeating keywords and word fields for structuring purposes. . . . In [certain] texts . . 
. certain key words keep recurring, like leitmotifs. Because of the associations which they 
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conjure up in the context of characters and plot, they become symbols which suggest connections 
and arguments at a higher level” (76-77). “To the best of my knowledge,” Fludernik adds, “there 
is no technical term for this” (77). Although I too lack a label for these repeating terms, I would 
suggest immanent reading for the reading process they inspire.   
 
III. Ménage à Trois 
At the end of the affair, underscoring the leitmotif of “backgrounds,” Marya waits for 
Heidler at a café—cafés being “the unvarying background” of their romantic rendezvous (177). 
This phrasing (“unvarying background”) echoes the “solid” or “fixed” backgrounds that we are 
told Marya lacks. In the passage about the pernicious impact of the “mania for classification,” 
Marya’s free-indirect thought views Heidler as  
forcing her to be nothing but the little woman who lived in the Hôtel du 
Bosphore for the express purpose of being made love to. A petite femme. 
It was, of course, part of his mania for classification. But he did it with 
such conviction that she, miserable weakling that she was, found herself 
trying to live up to his idea of her. (118; second emphasis added) 
Beware of such fixity, such solidity, the novel argues. Such reward comes at a steep price: it 
reduces Marya to whatever category the Heidlers impose upon her—here, a petite femme, “the 
little woman who lived in” dingy hotels “for the express purpose of being made love to.” Heidler 
seeks to control her, often admonishing her not to get “hysterical” during their quarrels (103, 
148, 149, 161). 
A more expansive example of the Heidlers’ “mania for classification” occurs soon after 
Marya moves in. Lois begins to paint Marya’s portrait, Lois’ “chest well out, her round, brown 
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eyes travelling rapidly from the sitter to the canvas and back again” (59). The reference to Marya 
as “the sitter” precludes Marya as the focal point. For Marya would not perceive herself as “the 
sitter,” or the object captured by the painter’s gaze. Such an alienated perspective properly 
belongs to the painter or the narrator, or both. Indeed, if there is a focalizing subject, it turns out 
to be Lois herself: 
The movement of her [Lois’] head was oddly like that of a bird picking up 
crumbs. She talked volubly. She would often stop painting to talk, and it 
was evident that she took Montparnasse very seriously indeed. She 
thought of it as a possible stepping-stone to higher things and she liked 
explaining, classifying, fitting the inhabitants (that is to say, of course, the 
Anglo-Saxon inhabitants) into their proper places in the scheme of things. 
The Beautiful Young Men, the Dazzlers, the Middle Westerners, the 
Down-and-Outs, the Freaks who never would do anything, the Freaks who 
just possibly might. (60) 
Focalization in this passage is marked by the shift to free-indirect discourse, which does 
not simply report Lois’ perspective, but also uses her idiom (as in her use of social labels such as 
“Freaks”). Lois’ free-indirect speech, however, is ironically parroted (as suggested by the simile 
of her head’s movement “oddly” resembling “that of a bird”). In addition to what Brian McHale 
calls the “lyric fusion” (275) between narrator and character that occurs in free-indirect 
discourse, there is also an ironic fusion effected through the free-indirect style, anticipated by the 
deflating description of Lois speaking “volubly” and the “bird” simile. Even as Lois’ beliefs and 
expressions are faithfully represented as tonally imperious, she is meant to seem ridiculous, as 
when admitting she “took Montparnasse very seriously indeed”—but only as a project to 
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advance the Heidlers’ social ambition. But the key signal of the narrator’s ironic portrayal of 
Lois in this passage is the sardonic parenthetical phrase (“of course, Anglo-Saxon inhabitants”). 
The free-indirect narration doubles down on Lois’ penchant to “explain . . . classify . . . and fit” 
their Anglo-Saxon brethren as if exercising god-like powers (putting them in their “proper places 
. . . in the scheme of things”). The Heidlers’ ironically pathetic arrogance and naked social 
ambition is exposed from the inside-out, as the contents of Lois’ mind—discursive and 
ideological—are laid bare in brazenly categorical, opportunistic terms, terms that echo the 
“stepping-stone” notion that ends the free-indirect report (“the Freaks who never would do 
anything, the Freaks who just possibly might”).  
Lois’ classifying of their social milieu is a means to world domination—of the Anglo-
Saxon inhabitants’ world, of course. Ironically, the narrator’s ventriloquism of her point of view 
performs the same classifying operation it deprecates. By parroting Lois’ penchant for 
classifying, the narrator is “explaining,” “classifying,” and “fitting” Lois into her “proper place 
in the scheme of things.” What is more, the syntax of the free-indirect report mirrors the 
taxonomical impulse—a “mania for classification”—that is the subject of the passage. After the 
paratactic parallel series of “explaining, classifying, fitting” the inhabitants into their “proper 
place,” the next sentence presents another parallel series, that of the “Anglo-Saxon inhabitants” 
living in Montparnasse, the parallelism mirrored in the lack of a final conjunction (“the Freaks 
who never would do anything, the Freaks who just possibly might”). Hence, the double parallel 
series frames Lois with taxonomical precision, “fitting” Lois herself into her “proper place,” and 
then in turn enumerates the social types that her taxonomy fits into their proper places.  
By contrast, Marya is described in the very next sentence as “longing to assert her point 
of view” (60). Lois’ ironic detachment is contrasted with the warmth of Marya’s longing. Mrs. 
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Heidler exerts a powerful benefactor’s control, manifested through a classifying gaze (much 
more than a painter’s). As opposed to Lois, Marya has trouble “asserting” her own point of view 
while caught in the harsh light of the Heidlers’ social gaze. While Marya struggles to describe 
her life with Stephan, Lois characterizes it coolly and crisply, in contrast to the sentimental 
effusions that characterize Marya’s speech. 
Sometimes she [Lois] would ask questions, and Marya, longing to assert 
her point of view, would try to describe the charm of her life with Stephan. 
The vagabond nights, the fresh mornings, the long sleepy afternoons spent 
behind drawn curtains. 
“Stephan’s a—vivid sort of person, you see. What a stupid word! I 
mean natural. Natural as an animal. He made me come alive; he taught me 
everything. I was happy. Sometimes just the way the light fell would make 
me unutterably happy.” 
“Yes, of course,” Lois would say intelligently. “I can quite see how he 
got hold of you. Quite.” (60) 
The contrast in worldviews could not be more evident, nor the rhetorical precision that 
characterizes Lois’ curt reply from Marya’s rambling, vague, and emotional speech. On the one 
hand, Marya struggles to explain the “charm of her life with Stephan,” using abstract diction to 
describe him, such as “vivid,” a word that she realizes is too vague to describe a person (“What a 
stupid word!”). In contrast, Lois is presented, again, as a shrewd, calculating observer, a social 
climber who sees life in Montparnasse only as a “stepping stone to higher things.” In a related 
passage, Marya grants that Lois is “extremely intelligent,” insofar as she banks on conventional 
opinion to legitimize her viewpoint: “She expressed well-read opinions about every subject 
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under the sun . . . and was so perfectly sure of all she said that it would have been a waste of time 
to contradict her” (60).  
In fact, to describe Stephan as “[n]atural as an animal” is telling. Stephan is the 
antithesis—in Marya’s mind—of what the Heidlers stand for. He represents a “natural,” 
“vagabond” life, seemingly free from bourgeois hierarchies of social value. This is why Marya 
can think only of intrinsic, experiential, inarticulate attributes to describe Stephan and their life 
together: he is “vivid,” he “made [Marya] come alive,” “taught [her] everything,” he made 
Marya “unutterably happy.” No wonder she struggles to explain the charm of their former life! 
Their charming existence was, precisely, “unutterable,” thus incalculable by any measure of 
social hierarchy or material value. (Not least because such charm led only to Stephan’s 
imprisonment and Marya’s dependency on the Heidlers.) The Heidlers’ point of view dominates 
this scene, which takes place just after Marya has moved in. Lois coolly responds to Marya’s 
rhapsodic account of her former life: “‘Yes, of course,’ Lois would say intelligently. “I can quite 
see how he got hold of you. Quite’” (60). Lois’ repeated “quite” is as cutting as it sounds, as she 
coldly translates Marya’s vague, shadowy web of emotion into a rational social calculus, with 
winners and losers. Lois implies that Stephan’s charm was nothing but a ruse to “get hold of” 
Marya, a conquest and trap that Marya fell for. Lois coldly deflates Marya’s description of true 
happiness with her husband into the transaction of a predator marking his prey—to view Marya’s 
animal metaphor from Lois’ perspective. What Lois sees is not exactly what Marya says, but 
how she says it—how she struggles to say it, and then how her words are vague and abstract, 
vainly trying to convey the sense of being “unutterably happy.” Such ineffable qualities as 
“unutterable,” “happy,” and “vivid” prevent Lois’ taking Marya’s point of view seriously; they 
speak different languages of social value, of what counts as a valuable existence. 
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The two cannot communicate across this ideological divide, which is presented as a 
tension between incommensurable points of view, each with its own language and rhetorical 
style. It is thus impossible for Marya to persuade Lois of the value or even the truth of Marya’s 
experience, for such truth cannot be expressed except as ineffable, fleeting (“vagabond”), and 
already lost. Lois does not understand feeling and the unutterable, but rationality and the 
calculable: the classifiable. It is no wonder that after this scene, Lois thinks of Marya as 
“excitable,” an emotional creature naïve enough to fall for whatever pretty story Stephan told 
her. Even Stephan has a “mania for order,” indicating how Marya stands apart as overly 
emotional, which the Heidlers view as a weakness (77, 87, 178). Marya is even dismissively 
diagnosed by a minor character as a “neurasthenic,” while admonished by Heidler’s calling her 
“hysterical.” By contrast, the Heidlers have a “sense of proportion” (77).10 
Finally, note that Marya’s rhapsody about her former life with Stephan returns us to the 
motifs of light, shadow, and illusion associated with the point of view that finds such conditions 
salutary, rather than alarming: “the long sleepy afternoons spent behind drawn curtains”; “the 
way the light fell would make me unutterably happy.” Marya’s rhapsody echoes when the 
narrator explained “the value of an illusion,” and that “the shadow can be more important than 
the substance.” My point is not just that this example aligns the narrator’s sensibility with 
Marya’s. This passage represents a moment when the narrative discourse itself dramatizes the 
deep desire (“longing”) to present this point of view to an impassive interlocutor. Lois, in turn, 
can only see what—or, rather, how—she wants to see: “I see how he [Stephan] got hold of you. 
Quite,” thereby nullifying the value of the life being described, transforming it into a vision of 
Stephan as a manipulator taking advantage of Marya’s naïveté to take possession of her. Such 
possession over others begins by the act of classifying them according to one’s own “scheme of 
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things.” That scheme defines the Heidlers’ worldview as one focused on scheming, and 
classifying others to advance those schemes. 
 
IV. The Narrative Mood of Quartet 
One aspect of my main argument is that the narrative design of the novel anticipates the 
difficulties of interpretation, the reading of other people and social gestures. The novel’s key 
terms highlight why it might be better to understand, rather than to classify (or diagnose, for that 
matter).  
In Gérard Genette’s oft-cited Narrative Discourse, he claims a distinction between 
narrative voice (“who speaks”) and mode (originally translated as mood), or the “regulation of 
narrative information” (162), the ways the narrator influences how we interpret that information. 
“Indeed,” Genette writes, “one can tell more or tell less what one tells, and can tell it according 
to one point of view or another; and this capacity, and the modalities of its use, are . . . what our 
category of narrative mood aims at” (162; emphasis in orig.). Chief among these modalities is 
point of view—what Genette coins as focalization (168; Narrative Discourse Revisited 46).11 By 
“regulating [narrative] information” by filtering it through focalizing characters, the figural 
narrative—restricted by characters’ limited perspectives—offers the illusion of maximum 
closeness and maximum partiality through focalization. This filtering is subjective, and subject to 
the distortions of individual perspectives. (A famous case in point is the unnamed governess in 
Henry James’ The Turn of the Screw [1898], whose accounts of supernatural phenomena can be 
construed as mere hallucination.) 
Situating narration in subjectivity through focalization, and thus creating a narrative with 
a characteristically shadowy mood is the point of departure for my reading of Quartet. This 
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novel is a triumph of mood, chiefly through Rhys’ experiments in focalization, related by a third-
person narrator “who is not one of the characters but who adopts” their point of view (Genette, 
Narrative Discourse 168). Genette indicates that narrative mood is a function of perspective and 
ideology, while the structural hermeneutic distinction between understanding and classification 
in Quartet is mapped by Rhys’ handling of the narrative mood, which adopts extensive 
focalization in ways that are hard to describe within existing narrative theory.12  
Indeed, in his theory of mood, Genette seems to be hypostasizing the narrative discourse 
itself as having a certain texture, an overall quality that perhaps cannot be reduced to discrete 
technical categories that help to constitute it.13 The story of Quartet, Marya’s love affair with 
Heidler, is similarly encoded with a palpable mood. The novel is as much about how it relates the 
story as about the events that compose the story itself. The narration’s overall effect, or what 
Genette calls its mood, is achieved through its close contact with the “transparent minds” of its 
central characters, chiefly Marya.14 But focalized narration is only the beginning of how Rhys 
achieves the shadowy mood of Quartet—a mood that the narrator seems to describe, in relation 
to Marya’s backstory, as “a lack of solidity and of fixed backgrounds.”  
In a sense, I am equivocating on the definition of narrative mood as mode—as 
technique—and mood as affect, a quality or intensity of feeling that pervades, much as climate 
does, a narrative space. A moody painting or musical composition might be tonally colored in 
varying shades of blue. Rhys, I am arguing, creates a moody book, mood-as-affect, by way of 
manipulating the narrative discourse in various ways (mood-as-mode). Ultimately, mood-as-
affect and mood-as-mode are one and the same (call it mood-effect). This means that the study of 
affect in aesthetic forms like literature could benefit from Genette’s notion of narrative mood. 
His theory of mood helps us describe how fiction formulates affect, how it generates and 
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regulates it, through devices and choices in narrative form. 
Quartet’s characteristic mood is created primarily through the mode of focalization. The 
(third-person) narrator filters most of the information through the consciousness of Marya. 
(Most, but not all.) In this regard, Rhys is doing nothing new. But the mood of the narrative 
permeates the story world, rendering a world of “shadow” and “illusion.” The story itself is not 
as original—indeed, Ford, Bowen, and Lenglet each wrote their own versions.15 But what is 
innovative is how the novel produces this narrative climate of uncertainty and instability. And, I 
argue, Rhys does this by various means. Focalization is only the beginning of how Rhys achieves 
the shadowy mood of Quartet. But, for the remainder of this essay, I focus on how then novel 
regularly registers a distinctive form of focalization: one that reflects hypothetical points of view.  
The narration adopts focalization and various modes of presenting figural 
consciousness—including extensive use of free-indirect discourse, psycho-narration, and 
dialogue.16 But the most peculiar technique is what David Herman calls hypothetical 
focalization. Briefly, hypothetical focalization (HF), which I define below, is Herman’s term for 
narrative information presented “as if”: as in, if there were someone to observe event x, this is 
what she would see. But there is no one there—only the invocation of that possibility by the 
narrator. HF also describes the possibility of an actual observer who perceives event x but is not 
quite sure the event happened as it seemed to. Hypothetical focalization thus creates a story 
world of uncertainty and instability, a shadowy register of social space peopled with illusions 
and with illusions about people. 
This technique helps imbue the narrative with its characteristic mood and represents the 
hermeneutics of understanding versus classification that the novel champions.17 But my reading 
of Rhys’ novel as employing the technique of hypothetical focalization depends on extending 
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this concept from Herman’s original description to encompass the way it helps to define the 
novel’s mood. The hypothetical quality of numerous focalized passages also underscores the 
narrator’s gesture toward subjective understanding as opposed to objective classification. 
Hypothetical focalization at the character level, which is how it most often appears in Quartet, 
entails that individual figures become narrators of other characters’ inner lives. Or they project 
themselves as such, as in a major scene in a railcar described below.   
Before understanding the employment of hypothetical focalization in Quartet, I should 
explain how my account extends Herman’s definition. Herman defines hypothetical focalization 
as the “use of hypotheses . . . about what might be or [might] have been seen or perceived” 
(231). Herman defines focalization per se as a “perceptual and conceptual frame . . . more or less 
inclusive or restricted, through which situations and events are presented in a narrative” (231). 
For Herman, 
Ways of focalizing a story can thus be redescribed as the narrative 
representation of propositional attitudes, i.e., modes of focalization encode 
into narrative form various kinds of epistemic stances that can be adopted 
towards what is being represented in the narrative. . . . [W]hat I am calling 
HF is the formal marker of a peculiar epistemic modality, in which . . . the 
expressed world counterfactualizes or virtualizes the reference world of 
the text. (231; emphasis in orig.) 
What Herman calls the “expressed world” exists only in the mind of the narrator, that is, its 
reality is “propositional”; it differs from the actual reality of the story world (or “reference 
world”) as it exists in the narrative. This means that hypothetical focalization is legible in 
narrative statements invoking a probabilistic perspective, grammatically marked by the 
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conditional or subjunctive mood. If we tie his discussion to Genette’s notion of mood, we can see 
that Herman doubles down on the grammatical metaphor of Genette’s narratology, where 
narrative discourse is structured like a language into tense, voice, and mood. But now we can 
include in our account of focalization hypothetical statements that invoke a subjective or 
conditional perspective that “counterfactualizes or virtualizes” the world of the story.  
Yet Herman qualifies his definition of hypothetical focalization: HF involves statements 
of “what might be or have been perceived—if only there were someone who could have adopted 
the requisite perspective on the situations and events at issue” (231). Herman’s examples involve 
instances that invoke non-existent or “counterfactual” focalizing agents—such as the narrator’s 
interpolation of a hypothetical witness to Poe’s “Fall of the House of Usher”: “Perhaps the eye of 
a scrutinizing observer might have discovered a barely perceptible fissure, which . . . made its 
way down the wall” (qtd. in Herman 237). Herman notes two grammatical signs that “encode . . . 
hypotheticality”: the adverbial operator “perhaps,” and the subjunctive mood expressed in the 
modal auxiliary “might,” which, Herman claims, “implies a lack of commitment to the truth of 
the expressed world relative to the reference world of the story” (237). There is no actual 
“scrutinizing observer,” in other words—only a hypothetical one who, also hypothetically, 
“might have discovered” the famous crack in the House of Usher. Herman also adduces other 
forms of HF, instances where, unlike Poe’s virtual observer, the focalizor does exist, but only 
their function as focalizor is hypothetical. In other words, rather than positing an imaginary 
character who might witness the crack in the House of Usher, a narrative might impute a real 
character who possibly might function as focalizor, but only provisionally.18  
Indeed, characters who function as hypothetical focalizors abound in Quartet. Thus, 
when Herman defines HF as “what might be or have been perceived—if only there were 
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someone who could have adopted the requisite perspective,” he underestimates instances where 
hypothetical focalization occurs between characters—what so-and-so “might be or have been 
perceiv[ing]” (231), not according to the narrator, but according to another character. As such, I 
extend Herman’s notion of hypothetical focalization to include instances of narrative encoding of 
hypotheticality that involve character-based suppositions about what another character is 
thinking or perceiving, which also destabilize the reference world by projecting an expressed 
world that “counterfactualizes or virtualizes” it.  
 
V. Hypothetical Focalization in Quartet 
There are at least fifteen significant instances of hypothetical focalization in the novel. 
Ten of these adopt Marya’s point of view, presenting Marya’s insight into another character. 
Normally, the adoption of a character’s point of view is an instance of what Mieke Bal calls 
double focalization, “in which [the external narrator] ‘looks over the shoulder’” of a character 
whose point of view is adopted (159). Thus, for Bal, double focalization usually entails the 
overlay of narrator and focalizor. In Quartet, however, double focalization—one actual, the other 
virtual—often occurs under the nose of the narrator, as it were. In these instances, the point of 
view is Marya’s, while she, in turn, adopts the point of view of another character.19 These 
instances depict Marya’s free-indirect thought, in which she presumes to understand another’s 
perspective. Often this double perspective is marked as a supposition that can be proven right or 
wrong.20  
A key passage occurs in the opening chapter, when Marya meets the Heidlers for the first 
time. At dinner, Marya observes Lois’ eyes, finding them to be  
beautiful, clearly brown, the long lashes curving upwards, but there was a 
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suspicious, almost deadened look in them. “I’m a well-behaved young woman,” 
they said, “and you’re not going to catch me out, so don’t think it.” Or perhaps, 
thought Marya, she’s just thoroughly enjoying her pilaff. (11) 
Here, the free-indirect report presents Marya’s perception of Mrs. Heidler: first, Marya thinks 
that Lois’ eyes are physically “beautiful.” But, in the same sentence, they also seem to have a 
“suspicious, almost deadened look in them.” Next comes Marya’s hypothetical focalization of 
Lois, presented as imaginary discourse: “‘I’m a well-behaved young woman,’ they said, ‘and 
you’re not going to catch me out, so don’t think it.’” But the following sentence returns to simple 
focalization, with the narrator’s bird’s-eye view clearly demarcated: “Or perhaps, thought Marya, 
she’s just thoroughly enjoying” her dinner. Thus, the passage includes different kinds of 
discourse and different kinds and levels of focalization.  
But, more importantly, the passage encodes conjectures about Mrs. Heidler’s personality, 
based on Marya’s perception of the look in Lois’ eyes. These conjectures are formulated as a 
hypothetical statement representing Lois’ point of view, imagined as direct discourse. But 
Marya’s hypothetical focalization is immediately qualified, if not cancelled, by her next 
thought—also presented as conjectural, with the word “perhaps” “indicating possibility and 
doubt,” as Herman understands the “alethic and epistemic functions” of hypothetical focalization 
(Herman 237, 249n17). Thus, there is an ironic double valence in presenting a hypothetical 
perspective through direct discourse. To speak what “Lois’ eyes . . . said” mimes the indicative 
mood (“they said”), which is contradicted by the conjecture entailed in one character’s knowing 
what another is thinking. Even is “eyes” were able to “speak,” Marya’s perception is indicative 
only of her own vision of Lois, her own “expressed world,” even if it is presented, 
grammatically, in the indicative mood. The mere probability of this “expressed world” is 
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emphasized by the sentence, beginning with “perhaps,” which casts doubt on this first 
impression.  
Marya’s hypothetical focalization of Lois is thus immediately placed under erasure, 
proven to be fallible, perhaps even mistaken. But the indicative and conditional moods are not so 
much cancelling as balancing each other: just as the first impression of Lois’ eyes are that they 
are “beautiful but . . .” so is the point of view of Lois as “suspicious” balanced by a much more 
mundane explanation. This oscillation between darker and lighter impressions of Lois’ 
perspective is mirrored by other instances and, in fact, are structurally indicative of the narrative 
theme, that of the hermeneutic uncertainty of understanding others’ points of view. Marya 
catches herself getting carried away with Lois’ first impression, and, although she sets the 
conjecture aside for a less suspicious explanation, it nonetheless foreshadows Lois’ personality.  
Quartet contains several more instances of character-level hypothetical focalization. They 
involve characters imagining other characters’ inner life. Such cases of hypothetical focalization 
employ grammatical signals that a character is imagining what another character would say or 
would be thinking.21 These are signals that indicate an epistemic shift from the reference world 
of the story to a counterfactual expressed world of the character.  
A related instance bears mentioning, because it shows how a similar technique is 
employed to depict character-level focalization that is not at all hypothetical. In this case, the 
exception proves the rule. The moment involves Heidler focalizing Marya. Given the 
surrounding narrative context, double focalization would be the most apt description, narrated as 
Heidler’s free-indirect thought:  
“I’m still fond of her,” he told himself. “If only she’d leave it at that.”  
But no. She took her hands away from her face and started to talk again. 
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What a bore! Now, of course, she was quite incoherent.  
“The most utter nonsense,” thought Heidler. Utter nonsense about (of all 
things) the visiting cards stuck into the looking-glass over Lois’ damned 
mantelpiece, about Lois’ damned smug pictures and Lois’ damned smug voice. 
(129-30)  
Here, Heidler is mentally processing what Marya is saying: trivial complaints about Lois. His 
interior monologue is quoted directly (“‘The most utter nonsense,’ thought Heidler”), or narrated 
as free-indirect discourse (“What a bore!”). But Heidler silently begins to narrate Marya’s 
speech, which he views as little more than nonsense (“quite incoherent”). There is a 
reinforcement of this reading, since Marya ends by complaining about “Lois’ smug voice,” 
summing up the novel’s obsession with voice, with the way characters express their points of 
view. The free-indirect report ventriloquizes Marya, but is focalized through Heidler. It is a feat 
of narratorial engineering, and stands in contrast to most of the novel’s doubly focalized 
passages, which reveal an expressive, rather than referential, status. Thus, most of the novel’s 
character-level focalizations are not factual; they destabilize the “reference world” of the story 
by marking the distortions of subjectivity, achieved by attempts at intersubjectivity.  
Perhaps the most interesting moment of character-based hypothetical focalization occurs 
roughly at the midpoint of the book, at the beginning of Chapter 14. The Heidlers and Marya are 
riding the train to Brunoy, a fictional town in the South of France, the Heidlers’ weekend 
getaway. For the first time, Marya goes with them. As a consequence, and also for the first time, 
Marya skips visiting her husband in prison. She chooses Heidler.22 
They sat facing her in the railway carriage and she looked at them with 
calmness, clear-sightedly, freed for one moment from her obsessions of 
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love and hatred. They were so obviously husband and wife, so suited to 
each other, they were even in some strange way alike. . . . 
Lois sat sturdily, with her knees, as usual, a little apart: her 
ungloved hands were folded over a huge leather handbag; on her dark face 
was the expression of the woman who is wondering how she is going to 
manage about the extra person to dinner. She probably was wondering 
just that. (97; emphasis added) 
“[F]reed for one moment from her obsessions of love and hatred,” Marya, we are told, sees the 
Heidlers “clear-sightedly,” as if objectively. The shift from psycho-narration to free-indirect 
thought tracks the deepening of perception, from external to internal; from describing how Lois 
sat, Marya then contemplates what Lois thought. But the final sentence underlines that her image 
of Lois’ consciousness was not necessarily accurate: “She probably was wondering just that” 
signals Marya’s personal point of view and colloquial idiom, and underscores its hypothetical 
quality, as an observation that may or may not be true. It most likely is, for Marya is seeing 
“clear-sightedly.” When they reach Brunoy, Marya’s supposition is confirmed, as is the source of 
the double focalization: “Lois said, exactly as Marya had known she would say: ‘I must stop on 
the way because there’s not much to eat in the house’” (98).  
In this instance, Marya’s hypothetical focalization is proven correct. But its suspension as 
merely subjective is the important point; the reader does not know, yet, whether Marya is right. 
The narrator confirms that it was Marya’s point of view all along and that this point of view is 
ultimately correct (“exactly as Marya had known she would say”). She was the source of the 
narrative insight into Lois and Lois’ interior thoughts. In this case, Marya does so with a 
satirical, dismissive bent: the passage focalizing what Lois was “probably” thinking ends with 
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the dismissal of Lois as “[o]bviously of the species wife” (97). 
But perhaps the most interesting dimension of the scene is how Marya’s hypothetical 
focalization continues and becomes more affectively charged. Lois becomes weaponized in 
Marya’s eyes: 
There she [Lois] was: formidable, an instrument made, exactly shaped and 
sharpened for one purpose. She didn’t analyse; she didn’t react violently; 
she didn’t go in for absurd generosities or pities. Her motto was: “I don’t 
think women ought to make nuisances of themselves. I don’t make a 
nuisance of myself; I grin and bear it, and I think that other women ought 
to grin and bear it too.” (97) 
Transforming Lois into a “sharpened” “instrument” is Marya’s doing, through her focalization of 
Lois’ motto no less than her idea about what Lois was probably thinking. In this case, the 
description conveys intense emotion: note the series that renders Lois, in implicit opposition to 
Marya, as a cool, rational, self-controlled, and powerful—and powerfully masculinized—figure. 
The vehicle of the metaphor connotes a phallic object—a knife, or, better yet, a scalpel; the word 
“instrument” invokes a vision of the Heidlers as scientifically classifying, and then penetrating, 
the object of their interest (“sharpened for one purpose”). Rather than wounding, as Marya does, 
with “tears . . . futile rages . . . [and] extravagant abandon,” Lois cuts clinically with discursive 
aplomb (117). The clear aggression in the metaphor, however, marks it as less clear-sighted than 
Marya’s previous insight. But both descriptions are presented as of a piece, as Lois appears to 
Marya. Whether this instance of character-level focalization is objective or simply a fabrication 
on her rival’s part is partially answered by the narrator’s corroboration about what “Lois said,” 
which was “exactly as Marya had known she would say.” 
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But the meaning of the passage rests on the “probably” more than on the “exactly.” The 
“shadow” not the substance. After Lois, Marya turns to Heidler, who appears 
like the same chord repeated in a lower key, sitting with his hands clasped in 
exactly the same posture as hers. Only his eyes were different. He could dream, 
that one. But his dreams would not be many-coloured, or dark shot with flame like 
Marya’s. No, they’d be cold, she thought, or gross at moments. Almost certainly 
gross with those pale blue, secretive eyes. It seemed to her that, staring at the 
couple, she had hypnotized herself into thinking, as they did, that her mind was 
part of their minds and that she understood why they both so often said in exactly 
the same tone of puzzled bewilderment: “I don’t see what you’re making such a 
fuss about.” Of course! And then they wanted to be excessively modern, and then 
they’d think: “After all, we’re in Paris.” (98; emphasis added) 
The italicized portions indicate the partiality or conditionality of Marya’s perception of the 
wealthy married couple. Again, the lens of double focalization projects onto the Heidlers while 
never leaving Marya’s side in their “three-cornered fight” (117). Formally, this moment of 
hypothetical focalization recapitulates the content of the scene. The form of the narration 
corroborates the idea that Marya’s mind is a part of the Heidlers’—or, at least, she thinks so, 
since she can peer into them? She has “hypnotized herself into thinking” just “as they did”; they 
seem to share one mind too. But do they really think so? Marya’s focalization—one actual (“It 
seemed to her”), the other virtual (Heidler’s eyes “would not be” like hers)—highlights the self-
referentiality, the subjectivity, of these impressions, including the impression that one can enter 
another’s mind.  
The formal analysis of the passage should also consider the grammatical. There is a shift 
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from the indicative (“there he was”) to the conditional mood (“would not be”; “they’d be”; 
“they’d think”). Such grammatical signs indicate the hiatus between a narrator’s access versus a 
character’s access to fictional minds, access that can be proven wrong. The novel’s narrative 
interest turns on the subjectivity of Marya’s account, especially while this subjectivity is itself 
narrating what it presumes is going on in other minds. The narration thus indicates when 
objectivity falls and subjectivity reigns, but also when that distinction is blurred, in 
intersubjective moments when social reality becomes more like a shadow than a substance. 
 
VI. Resisting the “sadisms of epistemology” 
Marya’s (hypothetical) focalizations, marked as they are in the previous passage with the 
conditional mood of doubt and probability, create an interesting “modulation of intimacy and 
distance,” in Brian McHale’s terms (275-76). When one character seems to focalize another, is it 
an attempt at empathy? Or, on the contrary, as in the “species wife” episode quoted above, is it a 
bit of parodic focalization? Focalization is usually reserved for external narration. Quartet’s 
character-level use of hypothetical focalization, however, rhetorically reinforces the thematic 
obsession of the narrative with narration itself. Specifically, hypothetical focalization allegorizes 
how narration, or storytelling, is the central theme of the novel. Not storytelling tout court (Rhys 
is too canny for that) but storytelling from a particular point of view. Whose point of view is it? 
How fallible is that account?23 These are the kinds of questions the novel poses to the reader. It 
plunges the reader into the shadow, the illusion, the “lack of solidity and of fixed backgrounds” 
of subjective accounts, which seem accurate, even objective, but prove otherwise.  
I began this essay with the well-trod background of Quartet: as a roman à clef, it 
represents a partial account, one inconsistent with those written by the other principals. The real 
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“Stephan,” Jean Lenglet, wrote one of these, Sous les verrous.24 Rhys translated Lenglet’s novel 
as Barred, cutting approximately seven thousand words from the original French because it 
seemed to paint her in a very harsh light (Kappers-den Hollander 45). But what interests me is 
not the veracity of Quartet, measured against the other accounts of the affair. Rather, what 
interests me is how Rhys formally incorporates the thematic preoccupation—the obsession—
with point of view and with the limits that point of view places on the veracity, even the 
verifiability, of any story. Members of “l’affaire Ford” projected their perspective with varying 
degrees of success. But it was Rhys who formulated the mood of the story by foregrounding the 
ethical and romantic shadows cast by the four central characters. These shadows are cast most of 
all by the narrative technique of Quartet: one is the extensive use of hypothetical focalization 
and the self-referential narrative focus on this act as a problem, perhaps the main problem, of the 
story. The seduction of Marya by Heidler is rendered, as Carole Angier argues, without shedding 
light on Marya’s own culpability and motivations (183-219). But the narrative techniques of the 
novel, especially hypothetical focalization, indicate how the psychological drama of the story lies 
in its telling and may indeed be a lie in its telling—one can never be too sure. The novel, then, 
while siding with Marya, engages other aspects of narration that trouble the reference world of 
the story as seen by the protagonist. Rhys’ narrator largely sustains Marya’s point of view, while 
complicating the ruse of focalization itself. This narrative focus on narrative focus at a technical 
level corresponds to how the narrator describes Marya’s background as the lack of a (fixed) 
background, indicating the radical doubt that permeates even the objective narrator’s accounts.  
An interesting example of hypothetical focalization at the narrator level encapsulates this 
existential “lack of solidity” as definitive of Quartet’s narrative mood. Monsieur Hautchamp, a 
minor character, reads the newspaper. With “an expression of disapproval,” the narrator notes, 
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“he continued his article which . . . began thus: ‘Le mélange des races est à la base de l’évolution 
humaine vers le type parfait.’ [‘Racial mixing is the foundation of human evolution toward 
creating the perfect human specimen]. ‘I don’t think,’ thought Monsieur Hautchamp—or 
something to that effect” (32-33; emphasis in orig.).25 The “something to that effect” casts a 
shadow over this moment of focalization. Here, the omniscient narrator is not sure what this 
character thought, ironically is not sure that Hautchamp thought “I don’t think.” The probability 
that language gets in the way—for Hautchamp did not think in English—melts into the 
probability that fictional minds are not so transparent after all. 
One could say that this paper over-symptomatizes one instance of verb choice 
(“diagnosed”) in the secondary literature on Rhys. But my focus enables metacritical questions 
that may remain unasked if we elide the category-crossing of clinical and critical domains in the 
study of literature. Some of these questions include: What does it mean when we “diagnose” 
literary characters as masochistic? What does it mean when a literary novel, or corpus, as in the 
case with Rhys, impels us to read it as masochistic or, more broadly, as “diagnosable,” in some 
vaguely clinical sense, which can then be transformed into an aesthetic principle?  
Among other techniques, Quartet employs hypothetical focalization to unsettle the fixity 
of rational objectivity and systematic judgment. This moody book dims the lights in its reference 
world, refusing to provide the reader with a narratorial “fixed background,” in the terms of the 
novel.
 
Put another way, the use of counterfactual glimpses into other minds, rendered in complex 
forms of focalization, combines to create a story defined by its narrative mood, antithetical to the 
mania for classification. 
Given Quartet’s figural narration, its reliance on key instances of hypothetical 
focalization does not merely provide multiple perspectives but also emphasizes how these 
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perspectives are often suspended.
 
Such multiplicity and virtuality of focus renders subjective 
judgments illusory and susceptible to contradicting views—not only Marya’s versus the 
Heidlers’, but also, by extension, the reader’s. The theme encoded in the title Quartet and the 
character system that it references alerts the reader to the variability of these perspectives. 
Hypothetical focalizations trouble the actual world of the story by providing competing, 
conjectural, at times self-cancelling perspectives on the true narrative situation. There is no true 
narrative situation, in other words: at least not “true” in the objective sense. 
The ending of the novel, for example, leaves Marya behind after an altercation with 
Stephan. After telling him the truth about her involvement with Heidler, Marya threatens to call 
the police when Stephan plans to kill Heidler (179-84). But surprisingly, the end of Marya’s 
story is not the end of the novel. Stephan leaves his wife splayed on the floor: “Voilà pour toi,” 
he says, obscenely indifferent (185; emphasis in orig.). We don’t know what else happens with 
her. The story continues with Stephan and his new “girl,” who becomes Marya’s ostensible 
replacement on the last page of the novel (186). Marya is left behind, unconscious or dead, the 
reader doesn’t know which. Marya becomes Schrodinger’s protagonist, neither living nor dead. 
Her end is ambiguous and thus open-ended.  
Narrative instability strategically weakens the reader’s grasp of the ethical and 
psychological truth of the situation. This instability only deepens as the story goes on, as Marya 
cannot explain to herself why she continues in the affair despite her deep ambivalence. More 
importantly, the narrator does not fully explain, choosing only to foreground the absence of 
comprehensive explanation. The novel includes some perspectives, as we have seen, that 
“diagnose” the protagonist as “neurasthenic” (174) or “hysterical” (149), whereas others are 





pseudo-clinical terms are presented as unsympathetic judgments on the protagonist. By contrast, 
the narrator’s focus on Marya establishes the partiality of the story from the outset and provides 
the reader with an alternative principle for “understanding” her existence, by gauging what it 
lacks, or by suggesting that what Marya’s experience consists of is a lack. Readers, too, are 
presented with a discourse that lacks narrative solidity and fixed backgrounds.  
As noted, the social space that the Heidlers occupy is a well-ordered bourgeois existence, 
one held together by their “mania for classification.” However, the novel’s use of a 
psychopathological term (“mania”) to describe the Heidlers ironically impugns them as 
misguided for doing the same thing the narrator does: using diagnostic language to classify them 
as classifying others, a reflection of its focus on focalization itself. Nevertheless, the narrative 
seems to condemn this practice, even given the irony. Rhys’ novel rests on such ambiguities of 
judgment, foregrounding the (lack of) background, transmuting the solidity and fixity of the 
reference world of the story into shadow and illusion. In doing so, Quartet exposes the “mania 
for classification” that is at the root of the Heidlers’ power, which seeks to stabilize and control 
others through the “sadisms of epistemology.”
 
I’m tempted to say that the novel ironically 
(sadomasochistically?) invites this “mania for classification” on the part of the reader, even as it 
denigrates such an operation in its least sympathetic characters.
 
 
One curious piece of evidence for the instability of the novel’s world, due to its focus on 
the virtuality or partiality of perspectives—and one that is missed if we focus on psychological 
interpretations—is the question of how to pronounce Marya’s name. “Marya” is an ambiguous 
spelling for this virginal name—and she is ironically named, of course—though the ambiguity, 
not the irony, is the main point.27
 
When I last taught this novel, the class asked me how to 
pronounce Marya’s name. Typically,the novel leaves the question hanging, until it quasi-reveals 
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the answer. In their first outing together as a trio, the following scene between Marya and the 
Heidlers occurs, again representing the hypothetical focalization of one character by another: 
“Lois began: ‘There was a young woman called Marya. Who thought, “But I must have a caree—
er”’” (88; emphasis added). There we have the answer. But it is a passive-aggressive, even 
sadomasochistic, response; it pretends to speak for Marya only to humiliate her. Notably, the 
answer is belated, elliptical, and easy to miss. The point, however, is that such a fundamental 
question needs to be asked at all. While this scene provides ample fodder for the (sado-) 
masochistic reading, the importance of the name of the protagonist suggests something more 
fundamental is at stake. And that is, the aesthetic principle that “the shadow can be more 
important than the substance.” Marya is forever an unpronounceable character: a shadow, if you 
will. And no analysis can get beyond this fact, even if the illusion of an answer—Lois’ miming 
Marya’s voice, rhyming Marya’s name—shows that (sado-) masochism as well as complex 
forms of focalization inform its intersubjective dynamics.28
 
Quartet’s narrative shadows remain. 
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1 The reference is to Deleuze’s seminal essay on masochism as a clinical and aesthetic entity, 
“Coldness and Cruelty,” originally published in 1967. Deleuze makes a strong claim that sadism 
and masochism are incompatible and that sadomasochism is an incoherent clinical and 
conceptual category. This doctrine holds great sway, but I do not follow Deleuze’s taboo against 
thinking sadism alongside masochism, nor his claim that sadomasochism is a nonentity. Gayle 
Rubin makes an important case for the lack of material evidence to support Deleuze’s claims in 
her interview with Judith Butler, “Sexual Traffic.” 
2 The Rhys archive was once defined (some would say, distorted) by the so-called “composite 
heroine,” a construct for interpreting Rhys’ oeuvre introduced by Wyndham in the introduction 
to Rhys’ work he published in 1963. (This introduction still appears in the current Norton 
paperback edition of Wide Sargasso Sea [1992], showing its continued influence.) The gendered 
aspects of this problematic notion are addressed in various ways, and I do so in a separate study 
of Rhys that is part of my book manuscript, tentatively titled “Misfit Modernisms.” 
3 Readings of sadism and masochism in Rhys’ work are contemporaneous with the novels 
themselves. A review of After Leaving Mr. Mackenzie (1931) by Soskind of The New York 
Evening Post, for example, claims that the novel is “a sadistic book in that it presents the cruelty 
and poisonous satisfaction men take in downing” (or belittling) the protagonist, Julia Martin, “an 
already-beaten woman.” The locus classicus of reading psychopathology in Rhys’ work is 
Abel’s “Women and Schizophrenia.” In our own time, there is a growing field on masochism in 
Jean Rhys, as well as on modernist masochism. A brief list includes Dell’Amico, Colonialism 
and the Modernist Movement in the Early Novels of Jean Rhys; Moran, Virginia Woolf, Jean 
Rhys, and the Aesthetics of Trauma, esp. Chapter 6, “‘A Doormat in a World of Boots’: Jean 
Rhys and the Masochistic Aesthetic”; and Emery, Jean Rhys at “World’s End”: Novels of 
Colonial and Sexual Exile. For the intersection of modernism and masochism, see Sorum, 
“Masochistic Modernisms: A Reading of Eliot and Woolf”; Howarth, “Housman’s Dirty 
Postcards: Poetry, Modernism, and Masochism”; and “Modernism/Masochism,” a special issue 
of New Formations. 
4 Mitchell addresses the narrative style at length, though she does not delve into the specifics of 
focalization that I do here (200-02, 207). She writes: “At no point in the novel does the narrator 
reveal herself to be Marya. Instead, narrative control momentarily shifts to Marya so that her 
interpretation of Lois’ and H. J.’s behavior is the reader’s only point of entry” (202). Mitchell’s 
focus on limited omniscience as a form of “control” is consistent with her interest in the 
psychodynamics of masochism. However, my argument is that resistance to psychoanalytic 
interpretation is a formal principle of the novel, primarily in the focalizing techniques I outline. 
But Rhys uses others, such as ellipsis (152, for instance), which leave meaning permanently 
expected yet permanently suspended. 
5 This style is also called vision avec, or the figural narrative situation.  
6 An anonymous contemporaneous review of Quartet states that the novel is another chronicle of 
“the lost generation” that Gertrude Stein described: “Here, for the first time since Ernest 
Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises, is an un-sentimentalized development of an impossible 





                                                                                                                                                             
7 Empathy and sympathy are both ways of emotionally understanding another’s situation. 
Sympathy as I use it is based on a certain social distance and asymmetry between self and others, 
where one feels pity (or sympathy) for them. Empathy, on the other hand, entails the proverbial 
“putting oneself in another’s shoes,” or being able to connect across social distance to see the 
world through the other’s eyes. Marya accuses the Heidlers of being incapable or uninterested in 
empathy, and even of spurious sympathy. Their taking up Marya during her time of distress is 
manifestly self-interested. They are not Good Samaritans but are rather scheming to use Marya 
for their own purposes: Heidler to have her as his mistress, and Lois to keep an eye on Marya 
and thus retain a modicum of control over the trying situation. 
8 One of Rhys’ early short stories is titled “Illusion,” and concerns the contents of a wardrobe 
belonging to a prim and proper middle-class British woman living in Paris (The Left Bank and 
Other Stories). The story reveals a discrepancy between the woman’s dour, sober appearance and 
the rich riot of her fantasy life, as represented by fantastically colored gowns and negligees that 
she never wears out in public. This early short story, like Rhys’ first novel, illustrates the 
aesthetic principle of shadow and illusion that resonates as Quartet’s mood. 
9 The “sadisms of epistemology” is a phrase I borrow from Kurnick, who uses it in his discussion 
of Leo Bersani’s body of work (402). 
10 Readers of Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway will recognize the phrase “sense of proportion” as 
indicative of a point of view that, in that modernist classic, also stands as the antithesis of the 
sympathetic viewpoint of Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Warren Smith. The Heidlers’ “mania 
for classification” and “sense of proportion” are thus of a piece with the “sense of proportion” of 
Sir William Bradshaw (99, 100, 101, 109), the psychiatrist whose baleful intervention 
precipitates Smith’s suicide. 
11 The other modality of mood is what Genette calls narrative distance, which denotes how 
obtrusive the narrator seems, or how mimetic (or scenic) the narrative is, from most mimetic 
(extensive use of dialogue and minimal narrative commentary) to least mimetic (abundant 
narrative commentary, supplanting the story itself). For more on mimetic versus non-mimetic 
narration, see Cohn, “Signposts of Fictionality,” and Martínez-Bonati, Fictive Discourse. 
12 See David Herman on hypothetical focalization. Herman makes this point about the limits of 
existing narrative theory when confronted with probabilistic, as opposed to deterministic, 
storyworlds: At the beginning of his article, Herman writes that he “should like to examine a 
kind of focalization that the classical structuralist typologies do not include” (231). Rhys’ novel 
is a case in point that extends Herman’s concept of hypothetical focalization and draws on the 
ideological significance of subjective versus objective accounts of reality. 
13 Character-based focalization and its presentation in free-indirect discourse are the chief 
technical means by which the Proustian narrator of À la recherche du temps perdu—Genette’s 
example—sustains the narrative mood while telling the story of various characters, including the 
famous free-indirect narration of the love affair between Swann and Odette. 
14 Transparent Minds is the title of Dorrit Cohn’s significant contribution to the understanding of 
various forms of fictional focalization. 
15 Lenglet wrote under the pen name Édouard de Nève. He composed his account in French, 
published as Sous les verrous (1933), and in Dutch as In de Strik (1932). Rhys translated it as 
Barred (1932). Ford’s and Bowen’s accounts are represented in Ford’s novel When the Wicked 




                                                                                                                                                             
16 Psycho-narration is Dorrit Cohn’s term for the narrator’s discourse regarding the character’s 
internal cognitive and affective experience, in a more formal and distanced idiom from other 
styles of focalization, such as quoted monologue (Cohn’s term for interior monologue) or 
narrated monologue (free-indirect discourse). Psycho-narration differs from interior monologue 
(generally presented in the first-person, and in the character’s own idiom) and free-indirect 
discourse (generally presented in the third person, but colored by the character’s emotion, idiom, 
and spatiotemporal frame of reference). See Transparent Minds, Part I (pp. 21-140). 
17 Passages of hypothetical focalization can be classified otherwise: as instances of “ambiguous” 
or “double” focalization (Bal 158-59; Genette, Narrative Discourse 209). If focusing on the 
discursive dimension of the passage, such moments can be described as instances of 
“imaginary,” “modalized,” or “complex” representation of characters’ discourse (Moore 18; 
Sanders and Redeker 296; McHale 277).  
18 Herman’s example is drawn from Kingsley Amis’ Lucky Jim (1961), in a passage where, he 
writes, “the hypothetical focalizors are not themselves virtual entities; rather, their acts of 
focalization (may) have virtual status in the reference world around which the narrative 
propositions center themselves. Because the focalizing acts are not subject to (dis) confirmation 
in the reference world of the narrative, those acts figure as hypotheses constructed by a 
protagonist” (238). 
19 Genette’s section on “Mood” discusses paralepsis, his label for instances in which the 
narrative information exceeds the modal restrictions inherent in character-based focalization 
(Narrative Discourse 207-211). Genette discusses wildly improbable narrative passages in À la 
recherche du temps perdu in which Proust’s protagonist focalizes Mlle. Vinteuil’s thoughts 
while watching her through a window. As a first-person narrator, Genette argues, Marcel is 
technically unable to enter other characters’ thoughts, except by some “violations” of the 
narrative code of representation, as in the case of Mlle. Vinteuil. But my preference for 
Herman’s terminology to discuss such forms of paralepsis in Quartet is the emphasis on the 
virtuality of the focalization—instances that explicitly and clearly indicate its “hypotheticality.” 
See Herman (249n16) for a discussion of Genettian paralepsis and how Herman’s account of 
hypothetical focalization is consistent with, but goes beyond, Genette’s concept.  
20 As I mentioned, other examples of character-based insights into other fictional minds, many of 
which include the modal markers of doubt, possibility, or conjecture, abound in the novel 
(Quartet 11, 17, 51, 92-93, 97-98, 112, 115, 118, 161, 177). 
21 Note that these expressions in the conditional tense (“would”) are not temporal markers of 
futurity, as they are in the conventional representation of free-indirect discourse. As Cohn notes 
in “Narrated Discourse,” the standard tenses for memory and anticipation in narrated 
monologues . . . [are] the pluperfect and the conditional[,] which correspond to the simple past 
and future in direct quotation” (127). The moments I am describing are contextually marked as 
character-level focalizations of another character, with the conditional used to denote the 
hypothetical status of the perception. See Cohn (133-34) on “narrated perception,” which 
includes, in her example, a moment from Woolf’s To the Lighthouse that Herman would 
characterize as hypothetical focalization. 
22 See the chapter on Quartet in Angier’s biography for an excellent reading of this moment in 




                                                                                                                                                             
23 As opposed to a narrator, which can be reliable or unreliable, a character can be more fallible 
or less fallible. On the distinction, see Fludernik (28) and Dan Shen’s entry on “Unreliability” in 
The Living Handbook of Narratology. 
24 For an account of the discrepancies between the Rhys account of “l’affaire Ford” and 
Lenglet’s—as well as Ford’s and Bowen’s—see Angier, “Ford: 1924–1927” and “Quartet”; see 
also, Kappers-den Hollander. For more on the “scandal” of these warring accounts, see Latham, 
Chapter 6, 153ff. 
25 My translation. 
26 Nowhere in the narrative does the term “masochism” appear. Rather, there are other clinical 
terms, such as “mania,” “hysteria,” and “neurasthenia,” that are used to describe the protagonist. 
But, of course, there are many more non-diagnostic descriptors used in the novel. 
27 Marya’s nickname, “Mado,” also invokes the virginal trope.  
28 Latham makes a very different argument, which focuses on the scandalous, real-life aspects of 
Quartet, arguing that critics have “generally avoided a direct engagement with Quartet as a 
roman à clef” (163). He views formalist analysis, such as mine, perhaps, as evading this larger 
and more urgent historical context.  
